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FOREWORD
This paper was prepared for presentation at the Symposium on Societal
Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough? held in Warren, Michigan,
October 1-9, 1919, under the sponsorship of the General ｲ ｾ ｯ ｴ ｯ ｲ ｳ Corporation.
Most of the research was done while the author was a member of the
staff of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,
Austria. The paper was completed at the Institute of Animal Resource
Ecology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada.
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ABSTRACT
Risk is a people problem, and people have been contending with it for
a very long time indeed. I extract some lessons from this historical record
and explore their implications for current and future practice.
Socially relevant risk is not uncertainty of outcome, or violence of
event, or toxicity of substance, or anything of the sort. Rather, it is
perceived inability to cope satisfactorily with the world around us. Improving
our ability to cope is essentially a management problem: a problem of
identifying and carrying out the actions which will change the rules of
the game so that the game becomes more to our liking.
To cope better is to better understand the nature of risks and how they
develop. It is naive and destructive to pretend that such understanding can
carry with it the certainties and completeness of traditional science. Risk
management lies in the realm of trans-science, of ill-structured problems,
of messes. In analyzing risk messes, the central need is to evaluate, order,
and structure inevitably incomplete and conflicting knowledge so that the
management acts can be chosen with the best possible understanding of current
knowledge, its limitations, and its implications. This requires an undertaking
ｾ ｮ policy' analysis, rather than science.
One product of such analyses is a better conceptualization of "feasibility"
in risk management. Past and present efforts have too often and too
uncritically equated the feasible with the desirable. Results have been
both frustrating and wasteful.
Another is an emphasis on the design of resilient or "soft-fail" coping
strategies. The essential issue is not optimality or efficiency, but robustness
to the unknowns on which actual coping performance is contingent.
The most important lesson of both experience and analysis is that societies'
abilities to cope with the unknown depend on the flexibility of their institutions
and individuals, and on their capacity to experiment freely with alternative
forms of adaptation to the risks which threaten them.
Neither the witch hunting hysterics nor the mindlessly rigid regulations
characterizing so much of our present chapter in the history of risk management
say much for our ability to learn from the past.
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I. Fear, risk, and historical perspective
At the center of the risk problem are people and their fears. Fears of
loss, fears of injury, and - most of all - fears of the unknown. How we cope
with those fears affects both the material well-being and the spiritual
character of the individuals and societies we become.
Students of risk therefore face a number of difficulties in addressing
their subject matter, and surely one of the most serious is that of establish-
ing a useful perspective. The fears of risk are our fears, the people making
and taking risks are ourselves and our neighbors. Wher. we intellectualize
ourselves away from these ambiguities, our work becomes sterile, our subjects
ciphers. When we tackle them directly, our involvement makes critical
interpretation impossible and broader interpretations irrelevant. Unable to
see inside the problem, we trivialize it. Unable to see outside the problem,
we become part of it.
I suspect that work on contemporary risks will always contain some
elements of this contradiction. To better appreciate the problem we are in,
to better orient our directions for the future, a backward look into the history
of societal risk assessment therefore seems in order. Here, with the perspective
of time, we should be able to perceive some of the pitfalls and opportunities
of risk management which our intimate involvement in the contemporary scene
denies us.
Unfortunately, what must have been a truly monumental environmental
impact assessment on the Seven Days of Creation has been lost. But societal
risk assessment nonetheless has a history as long as man's efforts to explain,
manipulate, and cope with his fears and the unknown. Much of this is still
accessible to us, and should have some lessons to teach. That at least is
a possibility, and one that has not yet been explored.
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For several years now I have been trying to convince some competent
historians to undertake a retrospective study of societal risk, all to no
avail. The present historical "essay" is the result, and I emphasize that I
use that term in its original sense of an amateur's first attempt. This
attempt has been fun, and has provided me some interesting perspectives on
our present risk dilemmas. I hope its transgressions of historical fact will
sufficiently outrage professionals that their rebuttals can begin the serious
study which I seriously do believe is needed.
In the next three sections I review what seem to me three particularly
instructive episodes in the history of social risk assessment. The European
witch craze of the 16th and 17th centuries is treated in Section II, some
North American experience in renewable resource management in Section III,
and medical drug regulation in Section IV. The historical perspective derived
from these studies is used iri Section V to shed some light on the unasked
question of "What are we arguing about?" in the contemporary risk debate.
Finally, in Section VI, I look forward to the prospects for adaptive design
of risk management policy.
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II. Witch hunts: On the social psychology of risk*
For several centuries spanning the Renaissance and Reformation,
societal risk assessment meant witch hunting. Contemporary accounts record
wheat inexplicably rotting in the fields, sheep dying of unknown causes,
vineyards smitten with unseasonable frost, human disease and impotence on
the rise. In other words, a litany of life's sorrows not very different
from those which concern us today.
The institutionalized expertise of that earlier time resided with the
Church. Then, as now, the experts were called upon to provide explanation
of the unknown and to mitigate its undesirable consequences. Rather than
seek particular sources of particular evils, rather than acknowledge their
own limitations and ignorance, these experts assigned the generic name of
"witchcraft" to the phenomenology of the unknown. Having a name, they pro-
ceeded to found a new professional interest dedicated to its investigation
and control.
As the true magnitude of the witch problem became more apparent, the
Church enlisted the Inquisition, an applied institution specifically
designed to address pressing social concerns. The Inquisition became tne
growth industry of the day, offering exciting work, rapid advancement, and
wide recognition to its professional and technical workers. Its creative
and energetic efforts to create a witch-free world unearthed dangers in
the most unlikely places; the rates of witch identification, assessment and
evaluation soared. By the dawn of the En1ightenment,-witches had been
virtually eliminated from Europe and North America. Crop failures, disease,
*This section draws from Trevor-Roper (1), Harris (2), Duerr (3), and
Summer's translation of the Malleus (4).
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and general misfortune had not. And more than half a million people had
been burned at the stake, largely "for crimes they committed in someone else's
dreams" (2, p. 221).
How did the expert institutions of the day come to wreak such havoc
on the people they sought to protect? Answers to this question provide some
useful perspectives for our present attempts to assess societal risk.
Witches and witchcraft can be traced back to the very beginnings of
history. For centuries, people had found "witches" a convenient label for
their fears of the unknown, an adequate explanation for the inevitable mis-
fortunes which befell one's crops, health, and happiness. For centuries,
the Church adopted a skeptical and largely academic approach to these
explanations, preaching the difference between fact and fantasy, and
placing witches squarely in the latter category. Witchcraft, if it existed
at all, was an illusion sent by the devil. These illusions were frowned
upon and even prohibited by law. But individual witches and witch mongers
were not sought out by the Church and, if brought to its attention, were
merely advised of their errors and urged to desist. Persistent individuals
were simply excommunicated. The social structure, represented by the Church,
declared itself no longer interested in or responsible for the welfare of
those individuals. If the miscreants chose to ignore responsible advice,
their subsequent fate was their own business, and the devil's. Witches
remained an individualized risk, requiring individual responses by
individual members of the Church and lay communities.
Wildavsky (5) has spoken of the Ｇ ｾ ｡ ｴ ･ ｲ ｳ ｨ ･ ､ Ｂ which is passed when such
individualized issues are collectivized under unified social policies.
Institor and Sprenger's Malleus Maleficarum (The Hammer of the ｗ ｩ ｴ ｣ ｨ ･ ｳ ｾ
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published in 1486) was for the witch hunting business that collective
consciousness watershed which Kefauver's Hearings would later be for drug
regulators, and Rachel Carson's Silent Spring for environmentalists.
Massive in its scope and evidence, impelling in its argument, the Malleus
showed that witches did in fact exist, with real power for evil. As
agents of Satan, they were a heresy - a dangerous sin in need of eradica-
tion. Not individuals, but society as a whole was in peril as long as
witches remained at large. Pope Innocent VIII credited this argument,
and his bull Summis desiderantes affectibus authorized full application
of the Inquisition, including torture, to the eradication of witches.
The witch risk, to use another of Wildavsky's (5) terms, had been "social-
ized". Collective action by the central authority was henceforth required,
and any action taken against a particular individual was justified in the
name of the common good. In the case of the witch hunts, this "common
good" justified the carbonization of five hundred thousand individuals,
the infliction of untold suffering, and the generation of a climate of
fear and distrust - all in the name of the most elite and educated
institution of the day.
Modern risk assessors do not incinerate their fellow citizens.
Furthermore, they seek to insure against milder forms of witch hunting
by a scientific approach to gathering and evaluating evidence on risk
issues. But the history of witch hunting suggests that what we say we
are doing or wish to be doing in contemporary risk assessment may be far
removed from what actually occurs. Again, the historical perspective
may help us to recognize some of these discrepancies, and to provide a
basis for their resolution.
- 6 -
The institutionalized efforts of the Church to control witches can be
seen, in retrospect, to have led to witch proliferation. Early preaching
against witchcraft and its evils almost certainly put the idea of witches
into many a head which never would have imagined such things if left to its
own devices. The harder the Inquisition looked, the bigger its staff, the
stronger its motivation, the more witches it discovered. Similar trends
have been documented in the modern literature on hazard and have long posed
difficulties for those seeking to document the crime prevention effectiveness
of larger police forces (e.g. 6, Fig. 1-1). A general question therefore
arises concerning the causal relationship between assessment and risk:
Which is driving which? A strong case can be made for the notion that
search effort creates the thing being sought. Since the resulting higher
discovery rate of witch risks obviously justifies more search effort, the
whole process becomes self-contained and self-amplifying, with no prospect
of natural limitation based on some externally determined "objective"
frequency of witch risks in the environment.
The way we ask questions, and the kinds of evidence we admit in our
attempts to answer them, are of the utmost importance here. The Inquisition
asked "Are you a witch?" and proceeded to examine the evidence to see if
you were. Today, whatever we title our symposia, we ask "Is this a risk?"
and proceed accordingly. In neither case is there any conceivable empirical
observation which CQu1d logically force an answer Ｂ ｎ ｯ ｾ Ｂ Ｎ In neither case
is there a "stopping rule" which can logically terminate the investigation
short of a revelation of guilt.
In witch hunting, accusation was tantamount to conviction. Acquittal
was arbitrary, dependent on the flagging zeal of the prosecutor. It
was always reversible if new evidence appeared. You couldn't win, and
you could only leave the game by losing. The Inquisition's principal tool
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for identifying witches was torture. The accused was asked if she was a
witch. If she said no, what else would you expect of a witch? So she was
tortured until she confessed the truth. The Inquisitors justified ever more
stringent tortures on the grounds that it would be prohibitively dangerous
for a real witch to escape detection. Of course an innocent person would
never confess to being a witch (a heretic with no prospects of salvation)
under mere physical suffering. The few who lived through such tests were
likely to spend the rest of their lives as physical or mental cripples.
Most found it easier to give up and burn.
And today? What is not a risk with a parts-per-billion test can always
be exposed to a parts-per-tri11ion examination. If rats cope with .the
heaviest dose of a chemical that can be soaked into their food and water,
you can always gavage them. Or try mice or rabbits. Again, the only
stopping rule is discovery of the sought-for effect, or exhaustion of the
investigator (or his funds). Many of the risk assessment procedures used
today are logically indistinguishable from those used by the Inquisition.
The absence of "stopping rules" means that both fail to meet Popper's (7)
"demarcation" criterion for true science. Since neither is advancing
falsifiable propositions, neither is capable of producing anything more
than propaganda for its own prejudices.*
Modern science's defense against self-delusion relies upon a spirit of
open and critical inquiry. This, though hardly infallible, ostensibly
uncovers errors and thereby proceeds towards objective truth. Once again,
however, exactly the same high principle failed in actual practice during
the heyday of the Inquisition. Within the 16th century Church, hardly a
*On "propaganda" in this context, see Feyerabend (8). It is worth noting
that both witch hunts and risk assessments also fail to meet Kuhn's
weaker "puzzle solving" criterion of science (see 9).
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voice was raised against the witch hunt, while those outside defended the
accused only at great personal risk. After all, argued the Malleus, with
such crop losses, child mortality, marital infidelity, and general aches
and pains as exist today, ""''ho is so dense as to maintain. • • that all
their witchcraft and injuries are phantastic and imaginary, when the con-
trary is evident to the senses of everybody?" Who, indeed? Only those
in league with the devil. And so the few philosophers and physicians who
did speak up against the hunts were themselves harassed, excommunicated,
and in many instances burned along with the witches.
Today, anyone querying the zeal of the risk assessors is accused at
least of callousness, in words almost identical to those used by the Malleus
five hundred years ago. The accused's league with the devil against society
is taken for granted. Persecution in the press, courts, and hearing rooms
is unremitting, and even the weak rules of evidence advanced by the
"science" of risk assessment are swept away in the heat of the chase (see
Section IV below). This is not to say that risks don't exist, or that
assessors are venal. It is to insist that skeptical, open inquiry remains
theory rather than practice in the majority of today's risk debates.
That those debates are so often little more than self-deluding recitations
of personal faith should not be surprising.
A last insight into our modern treatment of risk evidence comes from
the historical demise of witch hunting as a profession. In 1610, after a
century of witch hunting, the exceptional Inquisitor Alonso Salazar y
Frfas carried out an extensive analysis of witch burnings at Logrono,
Navarre. He showed that most of the original accusations had been false,
that torture had created witches where none existed, and that there was
not a single case of actual Witchcraft to show for all the preaching,
hunting, and burning which had been carried out in the name of the Church.
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He did not rule on whether witches existed. He did order that the Spanish
Inquisition no longer use torture under any circumstances, and that accusa-
tions no longer be considered unless supported by independent evidence.
The number of witches brought to trial declined precipitously.
In modern terms, y Fr{as had instituted a grand jury condition between
accusation and trial. Further, he had introduced rules of evidence which
recognized the perverse and essentially meaningless forms which unstructured
"facts" could take. Neither of these reforms has yet been introduced into
major streams of the contemporary risk debate. And very few retrospective
studies of the sort carried out by y Frfas have yet been conducted by the
modern risk assessment community.* When we realize that y Fr{as' study
occurred only after a century of active witch hunting, and that the practice
was not completely stamped out until more than a century later, the prospect
of rationalizing contemporary risk assessment seems distant indeed.
It is all very well to note the psychological and evidential problems
which led the Church to protect its fold by burning goodly numbers of them.
But witch hunts continued as an organized political activity for over two
,hundred years, and it requires a certain credulity to pass off such
persistence as a product of excess zeal and logical error. We may be
forgiven for joining the lawyers in asking "Cui bono?": Who benefited
from this complex, expensive, and destructive undertaking?
Anthropologist Marvin Harris has pointed out that to believe that the
main purpose of the witch hunters was the annihilation of witches is to
accept uncritically the lifestyle consciousness professed by the witch
hunting community. Looking at "its earthly results rather than its
*The invaluable studies of Lawless (10) focus on cases where a serious risk
existed, but was recognized late. Missing are the complementary studies
of legislated restrictions where no risk existed. I discuss some retrospective
looks in the matter of drug regulation in Section IV.
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heavenly intentions" (2, p. 237), the witch hunt supports a rather
different interpretation. Whether individual witch hunters sincerely
believed in what they were doing is not the point. As with risk assessment
today, what actually happens may be radically different from what people
think is happening. The benefit of our historical perspective on the
witch phenomenon is that, with hindsight, we can see that difference, and
try to learn from it.
To begin with, there was certainly an element of opportunistic
careerism in the Inquisition, and there is almost certainly an element of
opportunistic careerism in the present risk assessment movement. However
small this element, it is clear that it can do a lot of damage to the world
that the profession is trying to protect, and can bring the profession.into
disrepute in the process. The same reform Inquisitor Alonso Salazar y
Fr{as who restructured the rational side of the witch hunt was evidently
a worldly man as well. Besides instituting grand jury hearings and rules
of evidence, he revoked the law that property of a convicted witch could
be confiscated by the Church. The rate of Witchcraft accusations in Spain
dropped precipitously. It is interesting to speculate on what might con-
stitute a similar perturbation experiment for today's risk assessors.
A second point illuminating the witch hunt phenomenon is that virtually
no members of the clergy or aristocracy were accused, much less executed.*
At best, the profession was evidently incapable of coping with findings
which refracted on itself. In fact, it reacted like a powerful elite which
finds its own ox is about to be gored. One assumes that heretics accusing
these privileged elites were promptly identified as the devil's agents,
*H.C.E. Midlefort (1972. Witch hunting in southwestern Germany. Stanford
Univ. Press, Stanford) shows that of 1258 executions between 1562 and 1684,
82% were female. 3 members of the nobility were accused, and none were
executed.
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which they surely were. Anyone who has followed the recent debates over the
risk of recombinant DNA research*wi11 recognize that things haven't changed
much, and can imagine the outrage with which the Church must have reacted
to accusations upon its own house. The same episode justifies a certain
skepticism regarding the presumption that today's science community is
Willing to pursue its risk assessment activities into areas striking close
to home.
A third historical issue is less firmly established but, for purposes
of understanding the present risk enterprise, much more significant. Harris
continues his analysis of the witch hunts with an argument that they func-
tioned directly to increase the power of the elite institutions which
conducted them, and simultaneously directed discontent against those
institutions into relatively nonthreatening channels:
The poor came to believe that they were being victimized by
witches and devils instead of princes and popes . • . Against
the people's phantom enemies, Church and State mounted a bold
campaign. The authorities were unstinting in their efforts to
ward off this evil, and the rich and poor alike could be thankful
for the energy and bravery displayed in the battle. The practical
significance of the witch mania therefore was that it shifted
responsibility for the crisis of late medieval society from
both Church and State to imaginary demons in human form
Not only were the Church and State exonerated, but they were
made indispensable. The clergy and nobility emerged as the
great protectors of mankind against an enemy who was omnipresent
but difficult to detect (2, pp. 237-238).
*For a review, see P. B. Hutt. Research on recombinant DNA: the regulatory
issues. South. Calif. Law Rev. 51(6): 1435-1450 (1978).
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Whether valid or not, there is an obvious modern parallel to this
interpretation of the witch craze. Science has been under growing attack
in recent years for a variety of ills from wasting the tax dollar, to pompous
arrogance, to greedily destroying our environment for short-term personal
gain. The science establishment has recognized this, and governments are
now funding great programs on "research applied to national needs".
Individual scientists, with all the good will in the world, speak of the
need for "critical science" focussed on just such needs. If professional
interests such as risk assessment continue on their present course, it will
not be long before science can display its difficult and unstinting efforts
to ward off evil, its indispensability as "great protectors of mankind
against an enemy who is omnipresent but difficult to detect". This scenario
does not require venality, but only self-interest and self-delusion. Perhaps
for that reason alone, it merits our attention.
To read too directly from the witch hunts of the 16th and 17th
centuries to the risk assessments of the present would be to fall into the
trap of historical determinism. To declare without further ado that "It
can't happen here" would be to display naivete of another sort. At a
minimum as Trevor-Roper (1) has argued, the existence of the witch craze
in the midst of the Renaissance is "a standing warning to those who would
simplify the stages of human progress."
The "new professional interest of risk assessment" is not necessarily
a progressive step. Neither its professed rational-scientific foundations
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nor its concern for collectively redressing ills of the human condition
are enough, in themselves, to make it so. Both the potential for bettering
human life and the potential for witch hunting are latent in contemporary
risk concerns. Our pressing task is to learn how we can cultivate one
aspect of this Janus-faced creature while suppressing the other. In the
next section I consider some more recent risk assessment experience which
illuminates further aspects of this problem.
III. Resourcemanagement:
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On the function of uncertainty*
Some particularly useful insights on the basic nature of risk phenomena
can be drawn from a consideration of man's attempts to manage environmental
resources. The dual character of "risk" is again apparent. The river that
brings water, irrigation, and transport also brings floods. The plants and
animals with which we cohabit the earth provide us with oxygen, food, labor,
and a variety of more subtle benefits. Under other circumstances, they may
compete with us as "pests", attack us as diseases, or inconsiderately
disappear under the various demands we place on them.
There is nothing witch-like or imaginary about the risks encountered
through our relations with such resources. Failure to cope leads not to
the ambiguities of future purgatory, but to the definite and immediate
consequences of drowning, starvation, and consumption.
Anthropological studies have shown that pre-industrial "folk" societies
adjust to such environmental risks largely through modifications in human
behavior. From an external perspective, these adaptations often appear
mystical and arationa1. On closer examination, they often exhibit the
virtues of being effective a good deal of the time, of being flexible and
easily adapted, of requiring action only at the individual or small group
level, and of imposing little stress on the environmental system as a
whole (15, p. 982; see also 16, 17). Modern industrial societies have
tended to pursue an opposite course of adaptation, controlling and reducing
the variability of nature by means of large, long-duration, capital-intensive
"engineering" projects. These have indubitably succeeded in achieving many
*This section is based on the work of my colleagues at the Institute of
Resource Ecology, University of British Columbia (11, 12), and on Ian
Burton, Gilbert White, and Robert Kates's studies on man's relationships
with environmental hazards (13, 14, 15).
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of their short-term goals. But a look at the historical record shows that
many of these gains have been bought at the expense of expensive and
unanticipated long-term consequences. We have begun to discover that
variability and uncertainty are in fact important "structural" factors,
responsible in large part for the way our environmental and resource
systems work. In general, they cannot be removed or reduced without pre-
cipitating major changes in those Ｇ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｫ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｳ Ｂ Ｎ In particular, the control
of small, frequent fluctuations has resulted time and again in a growing
vulnerability to rare but large ｰ ･ ｲ ｴ ｵ ｲ ｢ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｳ Ｎ Consider some particular
examples.
Throughout the middle part of this century, the United States devoted
unprecedented expenditures to the control of river flooding. By 1960,
however, it was clear that the country's increasing flood control efforts
were supporting an ever rising level of flood loss and damage (18). As
might have been expected, there followed a great deal of acrimonious
debate amongst the flood-protection industries, Congress, flood victims,
and sundry academics. The facts were denied, explained away, attributed
to extraneous factors, and so on. But gradually there grew a body of
evidence showing that the early technological view of flood risk protection
had been seriously incomplete. People, together with their reactions to
perceived flood frequency, had been left out of the picture. When empound-
ment and levee construction made former flood plains less prone to flooding,
people reacted by moving into areas which now appeared "safe enough".
Good control of normal river fluctuations was indeed achieved, and the
previously farmed lands became more and more densely settled, their flooding
history a more and more distant reality. When an exceptional flood eventually
did exceed capacity of the flood works - or, much more rarely, when those
works failed under less than their designed tolerances - the floods which
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resulted caused unprecedented damage (14, 18). Only now are comprehensive
strategies, incorporating the human element, beginning to be devised. And
these, almost without exception, are emphasizing mitigation and flexibility
of response rather than the old litany of flood "control" (13).
A related phenomenon is documented repeatedly in the pest control
literature. For example, in the period 1947-1974, agricultural use of
insecticides in the United States increased over ten-fold. Over the same
period, the rate of crop loss to insect pests ｾ by a factor of two (19).
In American corn production, while the acreage treated for pests has risen
from 1% to 52%, crop losses have risen nearly four-fold (19). Nor can we
simply stop using insecticides and hope things will go back to their original
variable but endurable state of affairs. Though this might be possible in
some theoretical long run, the short-term implications for farmers and
food supply would be devastating. We are, sadly but simply, hooked on a
risk control policy which gives us little, but which we can no longer do
without. The broad result of our efforts to control pest risks has been to
increase not only immediate damages, but also vulnerability to future
surprises. There is no simple explanation for these seemingly perverse
relationships. In some individual crops the results have been better.
In others the losses are in part due to changes in tillage and usage practice
which accompanied the increases of insecticides. But in many well-studied
cases, it is clear that man's crude efforts to eliminate natural variability
in the resource system are directly responsible for the ensuing debacle.
One such case is documented by Canadian studies of the spruce budworm
(20). Under natural conditions, this normally rare insect erupts into
epidemics at intervals of 30 or more years, defoliating and killing a good
proportion of the older coniferous forest as it does so. This forest
destruction eliminates the insects' habitat, the outbreak collapses, and a
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healthy, young forest grows back in its wake. But these temporal uncertainties
make efficient commercial utilization of the forest impossible, and insect-
icides were applied successfully to control an incipient eruption in the
1950s. By preserving the forest in a mature condition - by reducing its
variability - this policy also preserved the biological conditions which
precipitated the eruption in the first place. Today, under the relatively
unvarying conditions of insecticide "control", budworms have spread throughout
the entire province of New Brunswick where they persist at medium to high
densities. Continuous, expensive applications of insecticides are required
to prevent an epidemic. The forest and forest industry are more vulnerable,
and at greater risk, than ever before, should the control policy fail or be
abandoned. The most intensive analyses of this dilemma have been unable to
design remedial policies with any but the most painful withdrawal symptoms.
Not surprisingly, a number of parallels to these pest-control histories
can be found in man's efforts to control human disease (11, 21). The case
of poliomyelitis provides an especially illuminating example. It seems
that prior to the 20th century severe cases of polio were rare. Minor
infections were probably contracted by most children, producing immunity
but few obvious symptoms in most. By the 19th century, however, improved
living conditions and public health measures - in part introduced to combat
cholera and other "unsanitary" diseases - had begun to isolate the more
well-to-do segments of society from their traditional childhood exposures
to various diseases. The reduced frequency of contact meant that these
"diseases of cleanliness" were often first encountered.in adult life, with
violent or fatal results.
This growing toll of polio cases, perversely focussed on the most
hygienically meticulous classes, fuelled the successful search for a
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vaccine. By the late 1950s, the incidence of polio was again extremely low
in the United States and an organized scheme of inoculations was reaching a
very large proportion of the school-age population. Once again, however,
there is some suggestion that this "control" of uncertainty and fluctuation
may well have increased vulnerabilility to large-scale disaster. Today,
polio has become for many a threat of the distant past. Public health
officials are finding it harder and harder to guarantee that significant
proportions of the population are not missed by immunization and booster
campaigns. It has been suggested that the growing complacency over the
"non-risk" of polio may well be leading us to conditions which could support
a major epidemic. The same is true for a variety of other diseases (see 11,
21).
Obviously, public health and vaccination campaigns have done a great
deal of good, and will continue to do so in the future. But the reduced
frequency of disease brought by vaccination programs is invariably
accompanied by increased risks of other sorts. Such alternative risk
structures - not the simplistic myths of natural exposure versus ultimate
eradication - should be the focus of policy discussions and analysis in
each particular disease case. Such explicit weighing of realistic
alternatives is not particularly in evidence. German measles vaccinations
for children are a case in point. Here, in exchange for protecting small
children against a relatively mild illness, we leave adults susceptible
to disastrous and debilitating attacks. It seems virtually certain that
a broader perspective would encourage the disease in childhood, and
vaccinate only adults who have missed natural exposure in their youth.
As elsewhere, however, a simplistic and counterproductive predilection for
"control" per se has so far prevailed.
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The unpleasant surprises historically associated with efforts to manage
pest and disease risks might be passed off as special consequences of intro-
ducing exotic compounds into complex biological systems. But precisely the
same sorts of unanticipated results have been encountered in apparently
straightforward efforts to reduce the risk of forest fire in America's
National Parks (2). Once again, initial efforts were successful, leading to
adoption of the policy throughout the park system. Only later did it
become clear that brush and scrub unnaturally accumulated in the absence
of small periodic fires were providing fuel for conflagrations of a size
and intensity never before experienced. Again, "withdrawal" from the
initially successful risk-reduction policy has been delicate and expensive
in the extreme (11).
A final example of the relationships among uncertainty, risk, and
resource management concerns the role of genetic variation. Studies in
evolutionary biology have shown that variable environments give rise to
populations with substantial genetic differences in traits relevant to the
populations' survival. One genetic type will be slightly better adapted to
one type of environmental condition, one to another, and so on. As a
result, over a wide range of environmental conditions, disturbances, and
surprises, some members of the population will do relatively well. The
occasional variation in the environment shifts the balance and prevents
one form from replacing all the others. It is true, however, that, if
environmental conditions can be kept constant, one form highly adapted to
those conditions will usually do better than a mix of forms. In agriculture,
this situation has led to the breeding and distribution of genetically pure
crop strains supremely well adapted to the controlled (low risk) conditions
of water and nutrient availability which modern farms can provide.
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A sobering lesson in the risks of such strategies was delivered to
American corn producers in 1964 (23). Huge tracts of land were by then
planted in a single genetic strain of high yield corn. When a disease
arose to which this particular strain was not resistant, a very large
proportion of the crop was lost. Disaster was averted because some
resistant strains were still available and could be used to replace the
susceptible one. As a result of this and similar surprises, much more
attention is now being devoted to the development and preservation of
mixed genetic stocks in agriculture. The lower short-term yields obtain-
able from such approaches is judged an acceptable price to pay for the
increased ability to cope with the unexpected.*
Looking across these diverse examples of resource manabement
experience, several common themes stand out. In each case, uncertainty
or variability in the natural system was initially viewed as a source
of risk/hazard. Without exception, it was assumed that removal of the
variability would be an unmitigated good, resulting in reduced risk and
improved performance of the resource system.
Initial successes led to optimism that the proposed management
policy would be an effective one. But they also led to changes in the
system itself. In each case, the existence of variability and uncertainty
turned out to have played an important role in establishing and maintaining
key relationships among the system components. With that variability
removed, relationships shifted to accommodate the new reality: people
*Unfortunately, it seems that we need to learn this lesson anew for each
resource system. Present efforts to enhance the production of salmonid
fish stocks in the Pacific Northwest seem likely to select for dangerously
narrow genetic stocks throughout the system (11).
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settled the unf100ded flood-plain, budworms spread through the undefoliated
forest, brush accumulated on the unburned understory, and so on. As a
result, the decreased frequency of variation in the system was accompanied
by increased vulnerability to and cost of variation when it finally broke
loose from managerial controls. Management efforts had changed the kinds
of risks encountered, but not the fact of risk. More often than not,
management shifted the risk structure from a sort people were accustomed
to dealing with to one they had never before experienced.
Failures and surprises of the sort described here have been instrumental
in sensitizing managers to the internal role played by variability in resource
systems. Detailed investigations have begun to tease out the mechanisms
involved in this sensitivity, and to let us make use of it in our policy
designs (e.g. 11). But if we have learned something about the different
structures which variation and uncertainty can take, our ignorance still
remains more substantial than our knOWledge. It is now clear that we are
unlikely to reduce unpleasant surprises in resource management merely by
increasing knowledge or imposing crude "controls". Rather, we must learn
to design resource management schemes so that they can better cope with
the failures which are guaranteed by our ignorance and the inherent
variability of resource systems. This need for designing "soft-failure",
uncertainty-tolerant management policies is receiving grOWing attention in
areas beyond resource management (24). Coupled with a concern for increased
institutional flexibility, it forms the core of an approach to adaptive
management which my colleagues and I at IIASA and the University of British
Columbia have been exploring over the last few years (12). In Section VII
of this paper, I will discuss some of the implications of this adaptive
management notion for societal assessment of complex, incompletely known
- 22 -
risk systems. First, however, I wish to consider one more set of historical
lessons, this time taken from a field in which solid scientific knowledge
of risk is at its most complete.
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IV. Drug safety: The limits of regulation
The history of drug development and regulation shows the risk assessment
profession at its best. The products in question are medicines designed from
the beginning to combat specific ills of man and to improve directly his
health and well-being. In return for their favors, medicines themselves
pose risks, but of a very special kind.
First, exposure to the risk is limited to those seeking the related
benefits. Second, the risk is undertaken in close consultation with a
professional trained to help his patient balance personal risks, benefits,
and alternatives in particular circumstances. Third, the nature of the
risk itself has been carefully investigated, evaluated, and described through
rigorous and sophisticated experimental investigations.
Each of these features of medical drugs should make their assessment
and regulation easy relative to other risk situations. In fact, people
dealing with nuclear, toxic chemical, or even traffic risks would almost
certainly be thankful if even one of the properties listed above pertained
to their systems. Looking at the history of drug safety efforts over the
last several decades, we might therefore expect to learn something about the
best that can be hoped for from risk assessments in other less mature and
tractable fields.
This task is facilitated by the National Academy of Sciences' sponsor-
ship a few years ago of a symposium with the familiar title "How Safe is
Safe?" That symposium reviewed experience in the design of policy on drug
development and regulation (25). Papers were presented by a variety of
senior drug regulators, producers, and consumers. With the recorded dis-
cussion, these papers provide a lively review of the current debate on drug
safety issues. In so doing they raise serious questions regarding the
limits of risk management. I review some of these below.
- 24 -
The basic procedures for risk-benefit assessments of medical drugs are
well established. Preliminary screening makes use of extensive information
and experience on similar products. Promising candidates move on to limited
trials in lower animals, intensive evaluations in higher animal forms, and
finally to closely supervised clinical trials on volunteer human subjects
(26). Real differences of opinion arise not regarding the logic of this
basic plan but on the judgmental issue of how much, and what kind of,
assurance is needed before drugs are approved for human consumption.
If a drug is approved with minimal testing to make it quickly available
to those who need it, people may be the guinea pigs who reveal unanticipated
side effects: The specter of thalidomide is never far in the background when
more rapid licensing procedures are debated. On the other hand, efforts to
approach zero risk through exhaustive pre-release testing are extremely
expensive and time-consuming. New drugs are delayed in reaching those who
need them, and marginal* drugs may not be developed at all.
Dilemmas of this sort exist in most risk management situations. The
drug case is virtually unique, however, in that different solutions have
been adopted in different countries, providing a prospect for empirical
comparisons of regulatory efficacy. The two most thoroughly exercised and
extreme solutions are those adopted by the United States and United Kingdom.
The U. S. emphasizes extensive, pre-market testing to mitigate the risk of
unanticipated side-effects, while the U. K. promotes prompter release,
relying heavily on an extensive system of post-marketing monitoring.
The explicit comparisons which have been carried out between these two
approaches are in no sense definitive or free from methodological problems.
*1 use "marginal" here in the economic sense of low market potential, low
profitability products. Some of these may be literally a matter of life and
death to the few who need them, and pharmaceutical concerns do market some
"public interest" drugs on which they will never make a profit. But one
cost of regulation will always be to make some such marginal drugs not worth
developing by even the most public spirited of private concerns.
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With some unanimity, however, they conclude that the U. K. practice better
advances the public interest (26, 27, 28). American regulatory caution is
argued to be needlessly expensive, stifling of new product development, and
not superior in its ability to assure drug safety. In particular, the
stringent safety testing procedures instituted in the United States following
the Kefauver hearings and thalidomide episode of the early 1960s are
demonstrated to have been a mistake in classic risk-benefit terms (9). The
clear and vociferously stated conclusion of such studies is that some more
rational form of regulation, including less expensive and time-consuming
assessment procedures, is long overdue for the U. S. drug industry.
But while American drug regulators and risk assessors are being condemned
as overly conservative by collective social welfare studies of the sort
cited above, powerful, articulate, and convincing consumer groups are
simultaneously attacking them for "caving in to industry" and neglecting
their responsibility to assure the public's safety (e.g. 30). Advocates
of this position cite the regulators' failures to detect risks which "could
have been" detected, and their ambiguous reactions to ambiguous evidence as
proof that the public safety is too important to be left to even the best of
safety experts. The beleaguered regulators have accepted consumer representa-
tion on their drug review panels, without anyone being sure just what those
representatives are supposed to represent. Congress has responded to the
political importance of drug safety by almost continual intervention in and
reorganization of FDA. Significantly, however, Congress' direct attempts
at "representative" safety regulation have resembled nothing so much as
Keystone Cops scenarios (e.g. DES, saccharine). And it has failed repeatedly
to meet FDA's own requests for an unambiguous legislative mandate specifying
what balance of risks and benefits does constitute the public good, how this
is to be democratically determined and achieved.
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What emerges from the "How Safe is Safe?" debate in the drug field is
that, for better or worse, public safety is now and is likely to remain a
primarily political issue. Scientific data and economic analyses - even
of the inordinately high quality encountered in the drug field - are simply
not going to be the central issue in even the most technical of risk
decisions.
This is not to say that science, data, and rigorous analysis are
irrelevant to actual decisions in drug licensing. Nor does it suggest
that carefully reasoned risk assessments do not have a role to play in
other fields, even when these are destined to deal in even greater ambigui-
ties of "objective" analysis than do drug safety trials. It does suggest,
and strongly, that the would-be "professional interest of risk assessment"
must reconsider its basic goals, and reassess its own potential for real
contribution to the public interest.
One direction which such a reconsideration might profitably explore
is suggested by Joshua Lederberg's "systems analytic" contribution to the
drug safety symposium cited earlier (30). He argues that contemporary
safety testing procedures, even in the drug field, often resemble catechismal
obstacle courses. These procedures undoubtedly do make it very time-
consuming and expensive to introduce new products or proposals, but rarely
has any effort been made to determine whether they actually do catch the
hazards to which they ostensibly are a response. Some of the drug screening
evaluations already cited in this section suggest that they often do not
(e.g. 29). Furthermore, the cases I discussed in the earlier section on
resource management suggest that simplistic or intuitively plausible
"safety" measures may frequently increase total risk.
Lederberg concludes that we must come to treat the issues of drug
regulation and management as problems of experimental design. Instead of
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routine adherence to large scale screening experiments on mice, or bizarre
attempts to determine cancer "causing" dosages of some agent, he calls for
"creative investigations that look for problems on the basis of some
theoretical rationale" (31, p. 80). It is the development of such ration-
ales, rather than of arcane methodological treatments for eventually
irrelevant data, which constitutes the central scientific challenge of
contemporary risk assessment.
At a more prosaic level, Lederberg's call for an experimental design
approach in drug safety regulation can be extended to the way in which we
make use of experience and information that we already possess. The
comparative evaluations of regulatory performance referred to earlier are
valuable contributions to the promotion of the public interest. On
closer examination, however, they offer little useful policy guidance.
Virtually no regulatory activity in any field has ever been shown to have
a clean bill of health when subject to essentially economic evaluation
(32). To conclude from such analyses that we need "less regulation", or
"deregulation", may not be wrong, but neither is it particularly
instructive. The "don't regulate" vs. "do regulate" choice is a sterile
and artificial one. To begin creating effective policies of risk manage-
ment, we must surely begin to view these issues at a finer level of
resolution. We need carefully designed studies to show what kinds of
risks our present testing procedures can catch, and which kinds of risks
they let slip by. Armed with such knowledge, we could begin to determine
the kinds of tasks which various post-marketing monitoring schemes can
perform effectively, and the kinds of situations where intensive pre-
release investigation is justified. Only when we begin to blend the
results of such studies in the careful design of integrated risk management
strategies will we be able to move much beyond the present unsatisfactory
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state of regulation by polemic.
Finally, appropriate blends of risk assessment tactics are not likely
to emerge from even the most sophistical contemplation. We will have to
learn to make efficient diagnostic use of the different empirical experiences
emerging in different countries under different regulatory approaches.
This brings us almost full circle to the notion of "adaptive risk management"
already suggested by our historical experience in resource management. In
the final section of this paper, I shall attempt to close that and other
circles suggested by this survey of historical perspectives. and to suggest
some general directions for future work in risk assessment.
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V. What are we arguing about?
The various attitudes towards the unknown suggested in my historical
reviews were captured nearly a hundred years ago by Frank Richard Stockton
in his story of The Lady or the Tiger?*(33):
"The young man could open either door he pleased. If he
opened the one, there came out of it a hungry tiger, the
fiercest and most cruel that could be procured, which would
immediately tear him to pieces. But if he opened the other
door, there came forth from it a lady; the most suitable to
his years and station that His Majesty could select among his
fair subjects. So I leave it to you, which door to open?"
The first man refused to take the chance. He lived safe
and died chaste.
The second man hired risk assessment consultants. He
collected all the available data on lady and tiger populations.
He brought in sophisticated technology to listen for growling
and detect the faintest .whiff of perfume. He completed check-
lists. He developed a utility function and assessed his risk
averseness. Finally, sensing that in a few more years he
would be in no condition to enjoy the lady anyway, he opened
the optimal door. And was eaten by a low probability tiger.
The third man took a course in tiger taming. He opened
a door at random and was eaten by the lady.
To interpret, we respond to the unknown by trying to retreat from it,
or trying to comprehend it, or trying to control it. The first approach
is evident in longings for return to a simpler "risk-free" life that
never was. The second is reflected in the fantasy of synoptic risk
assessment: Measure the requisite probabilities and trade-offs, calculate
the social risk-benefit function, and the common good will have been
defined. The third approach is in the tradition of professional engineer-
ing. It serves us well but, as engineers have been among the first to
point out (35), has met its match and more in the complex social risk
*Stockton's initial translation of 1884 has been questioned on several
grounds, but remains the most complete version available. I have used
his work for the first paragraph quoted here, but employ some of the more
credible alternatives for its variant endings, following the reasoning I
developed in an earlier study of the myth (34).
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problems it increasingly is called upon to address.
All of these traditions have one thing in common. They set themselves
in opposition to the unknown and try to overcome or control it, thereby
hoping to establish a more predictable and less frightening world. The
history of risk management shows the inadequacy of this approach. The
unknown is not a wrinkle to be ironed out of the social fabric. The
analysis that predicts the tiger will always be surprised by a carnivorous
lady. Our ignorance will always remain greater than our knowledge.
Fortunately, none of this need present really serious obstacles to
effective coping with the unknown. There is an alternative tradition of
coping which, though virtually absent from the contemporary risk debate,
has nonetheless long been a practical mainstay of successful coping for
man and beast. This tradition accepts the inevitability of incomplete
knowledge', seeks to accommodate rather than control the unknown, and
thereby aims to coexist with and prosper from surprise. In this tradition,
the "risk problem" is not uncertainty of outcome, or violence of event, or
toxicity of substance, or anything of the kind. Instead, it is the
challenge of coping confidently, effectively, and creatively with the
surprising world around us. The fundamental question is not how to
calculate, control, or even reduce risk. It is how to increase our risk-
taking abilities.
Nowhere is this distinction clearer than in the questions of medical
drug safety which I reviewed in Section IV. By any imaginable criteria,
the complex, biologically active compounds generated by modern pharmaceutical
concerns are risky things indeed. The sheer volume of production is fright-
ening enough. Add the high proportion of that production that comes into
contact with humans and you have a situation bound to dispatch a modern
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risk assessor for his injunctions and press agents. In the medical drug
case, however, the existence of a professional managerial framework within
which these dangerous chemicals are characterized and administered and
monitored makes them into risks we can afford to take, thereby improving
our health and well-being. Any narrow attempt to create a world free from
the very real risks posed by such chemicals would entail obviously unaccept-
able consequences. ｍ ｯ ｲ ･ ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ since many drugs are now most valuable in
roles for which they were not originally envisioned, any preemptive risk-
benefit accounting would produce similarly unfortunate results. In
contrast, improvements in our ability to take risks - in our knowledge of
how the drugs confer their risks and benefits, in doctors' and patients'
understanding of the trade-offs involved, in the monitoring and diagnosis
of unanticipated (positive and negative) drug reactions - all increase our
capacity to cope with disease and improve our health.
A similar emphasis on increased risk-taking abilities, rather than
decreased risk per se, emerges as a strategy for coping with the unknown
in a number of pragmatic fields which have tried the alternatives. Portfolio
designers long ago recognized the fallacies of "risk-free" earning strategies
(36). Boehm-Bawerk's Law, based on one of the most rigorous theorems in
economics, states that existing means of production can yield greater
economic performance only through greater uncertainty - i.e. through taking
greater risks. Strategic corporate planning has been defined by one of
its most successful advocates as creating the "capacity to take a greater
risk, for this is the only way to improve entrepreneurial performance." (37).
Most biologists, myself included, would concur with W. H. Auden's poem
"Unpredictable but Providential", wishing only that we had put the central
experience of our discipline so well:
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• • • for the animate, to last was to mean to change,
existing both for one's own sake and that of all others,
forever in jeopardy.
As a rule it was the fittest who perished, the mis-fits,
forced by failure to emigrate to new unsettled niches, who
altered their structure and prospered •••
Rene Dubos states the biologists' conclusion more bluntly (38): Ｇ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｮ ｧ Ｍ
ness to take risks is a condition of biological success." This point is
critical to our understanding of human risk-taking. Willingness to take
risks, together with knowledge of risk-taking consequences, determines our
ability to cope with the unknown. Confidence is as important as understanding
for us to shape the future in a rational way. The real challenge for the
"new professional interest in risk" is to contribute to both.
In seeking to meet this challenge, it is reasonable to begin with the
paradox of contemporary social risk history: The more we learn about risk
the less confident we seem to be of our risk-taking abilities. Hence we
have the spectacle of an American society which has a greater life
expectancy, higher level of material welfare, and more knowledge than ever
before, frightening itself into virtual catatonia, unable to mobilize the
risk-taking efforts necessary for coping with the unknown. A "new profes-
sional interest in risk" which cannot bring itself to address, much less
explain, such a central fact of its subject is hardly a thing to inspire
confidence.
Nobody knows what makes one individual or society believe in itself
while another heads for the bunkers.* After all, Columbus was venturing
into the void at the same time Institor and Sprenger were inciting witch
hunters to new heights of paranoia. It seems virtually certain, however,
that risk assessors' sincere knowledge-seeking efforts to identify
potential dangers can undermine the very confidence which would be
*For some provoking thoughts on the subject, see Gardner (39).
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necessary for creatively coping with those dangers.
The proverbial "little knowledge" is not only a dangerous, but a
frightening thing. We have already seen the workings of this in the witch
hunts of the Renaissance. Authoritative and, let us presume, sincere
preachers preached valiantly the dangers of witches and the devi1's
incredibly subtle and cunning ways of infiltrating society. In so doing,
they amplified society's latent fear of the unknown, undermined its con-
fidence, cohesion, and common sense, and thereby contributed to the
public hysteria which later fueled t;e excesses of the Inquisition.
Today, authoritative and, let us presume, sincere scientists preach
valiantly the dangers of risks and their incredibly subtle and cunning
ways of infiltrating society. The Chief Counsel of the Food and Drug
Administration admits "we often regulate more out of fear of the unknown
than out of respect and appreciation of the known "(40, p. 123). Society's
attitudes towards risks such as cancer and nuclear reactors are not
readily distinguishable from its earlier fears of the evil eye.
This is not to say that today's society does not face real risks, nor
to deny the real accomplishment of risk management professionals in dealing
with those risks. It is to insist that the dual character of the coping
problem - the need for knowing and willing - is virtually ignored in
contemporary literature on the risk prob1em*. Preoccupied with the knowledge
aspects of early warnings and assessments, we are caught inside the risk
problem and become part of it. Unable to see the relationship between our
knowledge-seeking work and the fear of the unknown it may engender, our
contributions to the real problem of enhancing society's risk-taking and
*The problem is not unique to risk studies. Lindblom (41) distinguishes
between the knowledge-based preferences which inform economic theory,
and the will-based volitions wbich, together with preferences, inform
political choice. In a penetrating essay on the nature of useful knowledge
(42), he characterizes these two complementary forms of social evaluation
as "thinking through" and "acting out".
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coping abilities are correspondingly dissipated or flatly counterproductive.
The challenge of establishing a rational perspective from which to
view risk problems and our interventions in them is, however, greater than
merely coming to understand the relationship between fear and knowledge.
Alvin Weinberg provided the glimmer of such a perspective in his
concept of "trans-science", first enunciated in a discussion of "How safe
is safe enough?" for nuclear reactors (43):
Attempts to deal with social problems through the procedures
of science hang on the answers to questions which can be asked
of science and yet which cannot be answered by science. I propose
the term trans-scientific for these questions ••. Insofar as
public policy depends on trans-scientific rather than scientific
issues, the role of the scientist in contributing to the promulga-
tion of such policy must be different than is his role when the
issues can be unambiguously answered by science. • . When what we
do transcends science and when it impinges on the public, we have
no choice but to welcome the public - even encourage the public -
to participate in the debate. Scientists have no monopoly on wisdom
where this kind of trans-science is involved; they shall have to
accommodate the will of the public and its representatives.
What is this "different role" required of the risk scientist? How is he
to promote scientific knowledge without spreading social fear? How is
the "will of the public" to be accommodated in risk problems? Neither
Weinberg nor anyone else has proposed definitive answers to these questions,
but in the last several years several lines of inquiry have been opened.
In reviewing these, it seems to me that there are two distinct if
related issues at stake. One concerns the incompleteness of scientific
understanding which can be brought to bear on risk questions. The other
involves the conflicts of individual wills, values, and freedoms which
bear on those questions.
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VI. Towards the adaptive design of risk management policy
Let us first consider the problem of incompleteness. In mature
academic science, the incompleteness and fallibility of knowledge should
cause no fundamental difficulties. Theories are held tentatively, contingent
on new evidence. Contrary evidence and new interpretations are granted
equal access to the debate. Independent experiment and peer review provide
checks and balances against error and unscrupulous behavior. Of course the
ideal standard is often bent or broken in practice, but in the long run, in
the majority of cases, good science does seem to replace bad.*
This is not the case, however, in what historian Jerome Ravetz has
called the less developed or "immature" sciences, especially when these are
applied to social problems (45). Here, a variety of factors conspire to
supress tentative outlooks and to seize on incompleteness as an excuse for
polarization. The result is bad science, leading to unnecessary public
alarm, unjustified and ineffective regulations, and an unwillingness to
undertake the risk-taking ventures necessary for coping with the unknown (46).
In part, the phenomenon can be explained in terms of a breakdown of
quality control within the scientific discipline. The relative absence of
established facts or criteria of competence tends to make peer review
ineffective. Add the pull of a socially relevant, "public interest"
discipline, and there is a real danger that the field will experience "an
accretion of cranks and congenital rebels whose reforming zeal is not
matched by their scientific skill" (45, p. 427). Where recognition and
grant money both accrue to those making the first, loudest, and most fright-
ening noises, where accusations of corruption, cowardice, or insensitivity
*Unfortunately, it also often displaces the merely different. For a
particularly readable and disturbing account of Inquisitorial intolerance
in modern science, see Feyerabend (44).
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are the most likely rewards of the careful skeptic, then the "great confidence
game" portrayed by Ravetz cannot be far off.
The fault, however, does not all lie with science. Harvey Brooks has
pointed out
•.• an interesting parallel between the scientist's desire to
establish priority for a discovery or invention, and the politician's
search for new issues on which he can make a name for himself .••
The potential alliance between individual politicians and scientists,
though often beneficial, can also be dangerous because neither side
is subject to the normal checks and balances of peer groups. Once
a politician has staked out scientific territory for himself, his
colleagues tend to stay away. At the same time the scientist is
speaking in a forum to which opposing scientific views are not
more or less automatically accorded equal access. The politician
is free to select his own experts to develop an issue in the way
that has maximum political utility to him. Truth may be only
incidental. (47, p. 259)*
Even the most conscientious risk scientist, trying to present a balanced
view of a complex and uncertain issue, is likely to find his argument
caricatured and polarized in such a process. Brooks continues:
Scientists inexperienced in the political arena, and
flattered by the unaccustomed attentions of men of power, are
often inveigled into stating their conclusions with a confidence
not warranted by the evidence, and • • • not subject to the same
sort of prompt corrective processes that they would be if confined
within the scientific community. (47, p. 259)**
While these and other problems of the incomplete scientific knowledge
in risk matters are widely recognized, most responses have essentially called
for a resolution through better science. This misses the central issue
completely. Thus we have the 1976 Bellagio Conference on Science and Tech-
nology calling for the scientific community to "evolve and sustain new
standards of scientific rigor appropriate to research in support of early
*Brooks draws the latter part of his suggestion from the studies of Nelkin
(48) •
**The difficulties encountered in scientists' statements to the media are
similar in kind and origin, and even more sensational in outcome.
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warnings and policy decisions" (49, p. 33). Or, for those with less faith in
their fellow scientists, there are the science court proposals for what
amounts to super-peer review (50). In both cases, the underlying assumption
seems to be that rigorous science, or rigorously reviewed science, would not
be subject to the incompleteness, polarization, and exploitation that
characterizes risk science today. With all respect to good intentions, the
historical experience of risk management* makes this assumption hard to accept.
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, response to the incompleteness
dilemmas of trans-science is provided by the growing craft of policy analysis.
In a recent Science editorial on the subject, M. Granger Morgan argues
Good policy analysis recognizes that physical truth may be
poorly or incompletely known. Its objective is to evaluate,
order, and structure incomplete knowledge so as to allow
decisions to be made with as complete an understanding as
possible of the current state of knowledge, its limitations,
and its implications. (51, p. 971)
Policy analysis of the sort Morgan describes is just beginning to
emerge from its uninspiring past as a branch of applied mathematics. There
are indications, nonetheless, that it does indeed offer a realistic and
rational perspective from which Weinberg's trans-scientist can shape his
"different role" in the social risk debate.**
In some ways, this role seems likely to take on more the character of a
jurist than a traditional positivist scientist. Policy analysis recognizes,
above all else, that "the data" are always insufficient to dictate unambiguous
conclusions. Rather, particular data are generated, selected, and inserted
into an argument as evidence in support of a particular conclusion (52). The
listener may be persuaded by the force of the argument and the strength of
its evidence. But there is no suggestion that data of themselves are either
*1 would argue, for example, that risk management of medical drugs already
has both the "rigorous standards" of Bellagio and the super-peer review of
the science courts. The debate is none the less acrimonious.
**The remainder of this section draws heavily on the concepts of policy
analysis as developed by Majone (52), Wildavsky (53), and Lindblom (54).
For another more systematically developed view see Quade (55).
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necessary or sufficient to a given conclusion. The debate therefore shifts
away from a preoccupation with "facts" and their "proof". It turns instead
to the careful development of rules for the admissibility of legitimate
evidence, and for the form of legitimate argument. Such rules are known to
be fallible - the guilty can be acquitted and vice versa - but fallibility
is accepted as an inevitable consequence of our lack of omniscience. On the
other hand, careful attention to developing ｭ ｾ ｴ ｵ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ agreed-upon rules of
evidence can create that essential willingness to proceed in the face of
fallibility. It has done this for drug regulation, and our health is the
better for it. Attention to rules of evidence can also assure against the
wilder tyrannies of self-evident "fact" where no effective peer review
exists. It did this in Alonso y Fr{as' reforms of the Inquisition's
torture and indictment procedures. Perhaps most important, formal rules of
evidence constitute formal hypotheses on how we can best cope with the unknown.
Viewed in this manner, they invite us to use our continuing experience in
risk management to evaluate our present rules, and to suggest improvements in
them. We therefore can learn from both our successes and our failures and
hope for some cumulative improvement in our risk-taking, surprise-coping
abilities. Contemporary risk management's inability to effect such cumulative
improvements, its insistence on re-fighting all the old battles with each new
risk issue, is one of the most discouraging aspects of its exclusively "fact"-
focussed approach.
The notion of learning from error is central to modern policy analysis,
as it is to those pragmatic coping strategies of man and beast which I outlined
earlier. The litany goes something like this: If knowledge is incomplete, if
the future is uncertain, then mistakes and surprise are inevitable. The
categorical imperative is to recognize such mistakes, to learn from them, and
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to modify future actions according1y.*
In this view of life, rationality becomes a retrospective but still
respectable concept. Since actual performance is contingent on facts unknown,
futures unborn, and choices we ourselves have yet to make, the "rational" is
evident only in retrospect. It is what turned out to be adapted to the con-
ditions that occurred, and turned out to be adopted by the powers that were
(52).
The problem of rational management is therefore to design self-evaluating
policies which adapt themselves to the developing situation and, in so doing,
cultivate the will necessary for their adoption and continuing pursuit. Such
a reconstructive concept of rationality is central to evolutionary (as opposed
to teleological) thinking in a number of fields (52). Its appropriateness as
a guide to action has been argued in terms of social psychology (56), economic
theory (57), and the purest of scientific endeavor (58). Furthermore, as
Majone points out,
This explanation makes sense of behavior frequently observed
among policy makers - such as incrementalism, adaptive adjust-
ments, imitation, and "rationalizations" - which must appear
to be irrational and/or dishonest in the prevailing models of
po1icYmaking. (52, p. 215)
Those "prevailing models", unfortunately, are the ones which inform a good
proportion of contemporary risk management activity. The synoptic planners,
cost-benefit analysts, and regulatory bureaucrats seem wedded to prospective,
knowledge-presuming notions of "rationality" in policy making: "Optimal" or
"best possible" decisions and decision-rules can be derived on the basis of
available information. These can be implemented by virtue of their rationality
(social optimality, expert consensus). Subsequent performance can be taken
for granted, provided always that compliance with the rational rules is
rigorously enforced.
*It has been said that a fool makes many mistakes, while a damn fool makes
only one. Over and over again.
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If this sounds too extreme a caricature of present practice, try any
other one that comes to mind. Michael Crozier, in his classic study of The
Bureaucratic Phenomenon, defines bureaucracy as "an organization that cannot
correct its behavior by learning from its mistakes" (59, pp. 186-187).
Regulation by such bureaucracies has become almost synonymous with risk
management in America today. From the policy analysis perspective, with its
insistence on an adaptive, "error-embracing"* response to the unknown t it
therefore comes as no surprise that risk management is in trouble. More con-
structively, policy analysis suggests that effective, rational coping behavior
may depend more than anything on our ability to design flexible, adaptive
management institutions:** Institutions which can respond to and learn from
the inevitable surprises awaiting us. Institutions which can mobilize
public will in risk-taking enterprises. Institutions which can improve our
ability to cope with the unknown.
Explicit policy analysis focussed on design of alternative institutional
structures for risk management has barely begun. The sterile debates over
"regulate" versus "don't", "threshold" versus tlnot ", and the like have
occupied center stage and most of the wings (32). Some of the notable
exceptions include Michael's (60) and Thompson's (this symposium) studies from
the human behavior perspective, the comparative institutional studies I
referred to in Section IV, plus those of Nelkin reported elsewhere in this
symposium, the explicit policy analyses of Majone (61, 62, 63), and the
applied work being done under the several banners of "mediation" (64, 65).
These suggest a productive future for policy analyses of risk problems and
their institutional settings, if only the debate can be turned in the construc-
tive directions they have suggested.
*The term is from Michael's (60) insightful study of the human aspects of
Learning to Plan and Planning to Learn.
**Significantly, this was also the overriding need identified by the previously
mentioned Bellagio Conference on Science and Technology; see (24).
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What that future will be like I am not so silly as to suggest in a
paper emphasizing uncertainty and surprise. My personal favorite for atten-
. h" l"f kt10n concerns t e sca e 0 our ris management institutions and arrange-
ments. There is a strong tendency today for every fear, every unknown to be
met by mandatory regulation at a national or even supernational scale.
This approach might possibly be justified in a world where one socially
optimal regulation could be computed in advance, or where the externalities
of local risk-taking decisions would be truly national in scope and unbearable
in effect. It might, in general, be justified if everyone wanted it. But in
most cases of risk management, not one of these conditions is met.
An opposite extreme, less well explored, is a variation on the thousand
flowers blooming approach to cultural revival. I suspect a careful policy
analysis would show that maximal learning and political will could bemobilized
by designing the scale of particular risk management ventures to fit the
character of the risk under consideration. Thus while we might require
regional scale regulation in such externality-laden fields as air quality
management, we might find that much smaller scales - and therefore more,
different learning experiments and less compulsion - would be appropriate in
other cases.
Medical drugs, for example, would seem to present the perfect situation
for experimenting with much more "local" autonomy in risk management decisions,
even down to the level of the individual. My finer fancies imagine the
Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) list of drugs being complemented by one
General Recognized as Uncertain (GRAU). Use of drugs on this list might be
at the user's discretion, with a full description of the known risks and
benefits available for advice, but a minimum of absolute constraint. The
liabilities issue would be difficult, but could doubtless be resolved with
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sufficient ingenuity. Appropriate, perhaps, would be voluntary "de-socialization"
of the risk in the form of an agreement not to hold the manufacturer account-
able or insurance agencies liable for adverse effects. I can imagine circum-
stances under which I would agree to such conditions, just as I would have
preferred the de-socialization of excommunication to the alternative of a
witch trial.
The more general point is that to the extent that large-scale monolithic
regulations could be avoided, "local" risk-taking preferences could be let
run their course as experiments in risk management. Government could shift
from its stressful role as incompetent regulator into a more congenial role as broker
of information. Is California's (or San Francisco's, or J. Fred Muggs')
approach to Laetrile working better than New York's? In what ways? Who has
a third approach? And so on.
Note that the apparent ethical dilemma in fact is less than it seems.
If we really don't know how to manage a risk, then we're all guinea pigs.
The fight over whose expert to believe can be transposed into a contest over
whose expert guessed better, and learns faster.
The challenges of helping to design alternative - even competitive -
coping strategies and institutions, of evaluating and comparing their actual
performances, and of redesigning adaptively in response to what is learned
should be enough to satisfy the most ambitious of risk policy analysts.
They might even make the future of risk management a more satisfactory
endeavor. than its past.
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